The impact of illegal immigration on the employment and incomes of Natives, with reference to Greece - transatlantic security and immigration project's publications by Glytsos, Nicholas P.
 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
ul. Emilii Plater 25, 00-688 Warszawa 
TEL.: (22) 646 52 67, FAX: (22) 646 52 58 
www.csm.org.pl, info@csm.org.pl 
 
Repor ts&Ana l yses         24 /06  
 
Nicholas P. Glytsos  
 
The Impact of Illegal Immigration on the Employment 










The Report has been published in cooperation with the German Marshall Fund 
of the United States within the project 'Transatlantic Security Challenges and 
Dilemmas for the European Migration Policy'. 
 
Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych 
Center for International Relations 
Center for International Relations© 
 
 
Nicholas P. Glytsos1 
 
 
The Impact of Illegal Immigration on the Employment 







The presence of a large volume of immigrants in Greece coexists with high 
unemployment of native workers, which leads easily to the inference that foreign 
workers take the jobs of the Greeks. A first critical response to this view is that there 
is no specific number of jobs in the economy to be shared by Greeks and foreigners, 
but endogenously created employment positions to be filled. Labour is not a 
homogeneous factor of production and the labour market is not consolidated to one 
whole, but compartmentalized. Native labour supply and its mobility are determined 
by a multitude of subjective and objective factors of an economic and social nature. 
More specifically, the desired working conditions and the kind of work that is 
acceptable are decided on the basis of household income, the support of the 
household unemployed members, as well as the social conception of prestige 
regarding the type of work one is considering suitable in relation to one’s education 
and qualifications. (Fakiolas and King, 1996; Glytsos and Katseli, 2005). 
 
Institutional factors that raise the cost of labour to employers, such as the restrictions 
and the high cost of dismissing workers, the high social security contributions, 
compared to the productivity of enterprises, have a negative impact on hiring legal 
workers, pushing some enterprises to the flourishing unofficial economy in Greece in 
which almost by definition the illegal immigrants work (Glytsos, 1995). The difference 
though with the native workers in this section of the economy is that the Greek 
workers have the choice of seeking employment in the official economy, while the 
undocumented foreigners are trapped in the unofficial segment. 
 
The employers in market segments with high employment of illegal workers are in 
favour of this situation, because of the low labour cost, while native workers in other 
segments of the labour market whose employment and wages are not negatively 
affected are not objecting to the employment of foreigners. As a result, the majority of 
native workers are tolerant in purely economic terms to the presence of foreigners in 
the country (Hillman and Weiss, 1996), even if on other respects may keep a 
negative attitude against them.  
 
2. Potential Impact from the Employment of Illegal Immigrants 
 
Theoretical approaches on the impact of illegal immigrants maintain that the 
importation of unskilled labour in a country raises, in the short-term, the marginal 
product of capital and skilled labour and decreases the marginal product of the native 
unskilled workers, as a result of the principle of complementarity. Consequently, the 
wages of skilled workers and the return on capital are increasing, and in case that 
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foreign and native unskilled workers compete for the same kind of jobs, the wages of 
unskilled workers are decreasing, or in case they are downward rigid, their 
employment is decreasing. Low wage illegal immigrant employment attaches an air 
of flexibility in the labour market that has been blocked by labour market institutional 
factors and government policies on wages and employment protection (Glytsos, 
2005:825). 
 
This way, the often narrow margins between the wages of unskilled and skilled 
workers, imposed artificially, either by labour union pressures or government policy 
for raising disproportionately low wages, are broadening. As a result, illegal 
immigrants contribute to the rise of economic efficiency, with further positive 
implications to competitiveness of the economy, but at the same time, they 
deteriorate income distribution against the unskilled workers (Chiswick, 1982, 1988, 
1995; Djajic, 1995). 
 
In the long-run, the increase in the number of illegal immigrants pushes the native 
workforce outside the unofficial economy and acts as leverage for pressing them to 
acquire higher skills and wages in the official economy. This encourages more 
investment of natives to human capital that eventually raises their income (Djajic, 
1995). But, on the other hand, the low labour cost – according to estimates 60 per 
cent lower than the corresponding labour cost for the employment of native workers 
(Lianos, Sarris, Katseli, 1995) - limits or postpones required structural developments 
in the economy and decelerates the use of more capital intensive productive 
methods. 
 
This is against long-term competitiveness, despite the short-term advantages from 
the low labour cost of illegal immigrant workers (Harrison, 1992). Additionally, to the 
extent that capital is mobile between economic sectors, is attracted to the low 
productivity unofficial economy, inhibiting more productive activity in the official 
economy (Ichino, 1992). This movement of capital is profitable in complementing the 
low cost labour, but does not promote growth, because it does not operate through 
capital deepening but through capital widening investment. 
 
From another perspective, the inflow of illegal immigrants generates chain reactions 
that intensify more immigration, creating in time almost exclusive labour market 
segments for immigrants, which has distorting economic effects, since the employers 
in such sections or regions of the country are relying almost exclusively on immigrant 
labour, organizing analogously their business (Collinson, 1994). 
 
It is clear from the above discussion that the anticipated effects from the illegal 
immigrants depend highly on the composition of migrant skills and the sectors they 
are employed (Lianos, 1997). The unskilled foreigners cover vacancies and 
contribute positively to the economy without seriously endangering the displacement 
of native workers, when labour market is compartmentalized, with limited inter-
sectional mobility (Piore, 1979; Greenwood and McDowell, 1986; Ichino, 1992). 
Under these conditions even the wages of native unskilled workers may, in time, 
increase from the contribution of illegal immigrants to economic growth. 
 
The lasting contribution of illegal immigrants in the increase of production creates at 
the same time corresponding incomes for its absorption. Immigrants are not only a 
factor of production on the supply side; they also have an impact on the demand side 
as consumers. In this capacity they are enlarging the market of goods and services, 
leading to more investment and through it to more employment of native workers. 
However, to the extent that part of their income leaks to the home countries in the 
form of remittances to relatives for consumption or investment - reaching as much as 
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half of their incomes - the internal demand is curtailed, with a likely drop of prices as 
a result of an increasing supply of products. In this respect, it should be considered 
that the greatest number of immigrants to Greece comes from the neighbouring 
Albania, sustaining significant trade connections with Greece. As a result, an 
important part of these leaked incomes are returning to Greece for buying imports. 
 
3. Results of Empirical Analyses 
 
Empirical analyses (for legal immigrants) in the US show that the wages of native 
workers are not seriously affected by the inflow of immigrants (the relevant elasticity 
is small) (Greenwood and McDowell, 1986; Borjas, 1993, 1994, 1995; Friedberg and 
Hunt, 1995). Similar empirical analyses in Europe found that the impact of immigrant 
employment on the wages of native workers is a little higher, which is partly attributed 
to the different structure of the European labour markets (Zimmerman, 1995). For 
Germany has been found that, aside from the decreased wages of certain categories 
of skilled workers, the wages of most other categories of native people are increasing 
because of the employment of legal immigrants (Bauer, 1997). 
 
Statistical estimates for the economic impact of illegal immigrants are limited by the 
unavailability of data due to the nature of this migration. Such estimates can only be 
implemented either indirectly or through econometric simulations. Within these limits, 
it has been estimated that the illegal Mexican immigrants in the US affect only very 
little, as the legal ones do, the wages of the native workers, because their jobs are 
complementary and not competitive to the jobs of Americans. It has also been found 
that the illegal immigrants in the US are not paid less than the natives with similar 
qualifications. Their relatively lower wages compared with the general average are 
attributed to their lower educational level and their inadequate technical expertise 
(Massey, 1987; Chiswick, 1988). 
 
The distribution of illegal immigrants among economic sectors is crucial in 
determining the impact on the native workers’ employment. Econometric simulation 
of an increase of illegal immigrant flow from Mexico to the US has shown that, if 2/3 
of the illegal immigrants are employed in the labour intensive sectors of agriculture 
and services, while the native unskilled workers are employed more in the capital 
intensive sectors, the employment of the unskilled natives will increase. But if only ½ 
of illegal immigrants are working in agriculture and services, the employment of 
unskilled natives will decrease (Grossman, 1984). In both of these cases, the wages 
of immigrants are decreasing, responding to their increased supply, while the wages 
of the skilled workers remain stable. All these findings are naturally related to the 
sectoral breakdown of employment in the American economy and the precondition of 
the free movement of unskilled and skilled labour between economic sectors. 
 
In Italy, illegal immigrants were found to compete with the native workers to a very 
small extent in general. An increase in them by 1 per cent reduces total employment 
of Italians by 0.5-0.3 per cent (elasticity -0.5 and -0.3). Among sectors, agriculture is 
affected much more, with an elasticity of -2.5, while in other sectors the impact is 
insignificant. Particularly in the sector of non-exportable services, the employment of 
illegal immigrants is complementary and not competitive to the Italians (Venturini, 
1997). 
 
In the case of Greece in which despite the two recent legalizations, illegal immigrants 
still constitute a considerable part of the labour force, the impact (positive or 
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negative) on the official economy employment and wages is significant. Low wage2 
illegal immigrant employment substitutes in some sectors for potential native 
workforce and leads to increased employment of Greeks in the open labour market. 
This is the case in agriculture and in small family business (Cavounidis, 2002), or for 
immigrants working as household helpers, releasing family members, particularly 
women, to the labour market to work for wages (Lianos, et al.,2004). 
 
In addition to the contribution of illegal immigrants in the Greek GDP, the economic 
situation of different population groups is improving. An econometric simulation 
based on certain assumptions concerning the penetration of illegal immigrants to 
different economic sectors, their wages and the proportion of their income sent to the 
home countries, has found that these immigrants reduce the average level of real 
wages, reduce the real wages of unskilled workers and increase the real wages of 
the skilled workers. They also reduce the employment of Greeks in all categories of 
the labour force, because as was found in this study, at least 1/3 of the illegal 
immigrant employment displaces Greeks, who have no desire to work with the 
prevailing low wages as the illegals do (Sarris and Zografakis, 1997). 
 
The above simulation finds that the income of the 37 per cent of the population, 
made up from the unskilled natives, wage earners in agriculture, members of urban 
households of low and medium income with an unskilled head, is reduced 
considerably. But the income of a broad range of other households, including rural 
households of all income levels and urban households with a skilled head, is 
increasing. The prices of products under the double capacity of immigrants as a 
production factor and as consumers are reduced, if half of migrant incomes are spent 
in Greece, as it is really done. The general conclusion of the Sarris and Zografakis 
simulation is that the low income households in their totality loose and the high 
income households gain from illegal migration, broadening the gap between rich and 
poor.  
 
4. Consequences from the Legalisation of Immigrants 
 
After legalization, immigrants move from the unofficial to the official section of the 
economy and in segments of the labour market in which immigrants and native 
workers can be competitive. This would possibly exercise some downward pressure 
on wages, a development that did not take place when the illegal immigrants worked 
in the unofficial segment of the labour market. In that case, the wages of the 
employed persons in the official economy were not directly affected, since 
immigrants had jobs that native workers would not undertake. 
 
Legality does not, however, guarantee jobs in the official economy with wages equal 
to the wages of corresponding native workers. The increased labour cost for hiring 
legalized immigrants may lead employers to dismiss their previously clandestine 
workers (Labrianidis and Lyberaki, 2001; Cavounidis, 2003)3. According to Glytsos 
(2005:832), there is a paradox here, created as a by-product of legalization, in that 
“legalization meant to be a serious step towards integration, may in reality push some 
legalized immigrants to economic exclusion”. This is one reason that many illegal 
                                                 
2 A 1995/96 survey in Athens found that the wages of immigrants (illegal at the time) were, for the 
same kind of work, between half and two-thirds of the wages of corresponding Greek workers 
(Iosifides, 1997:44). 
3 A 2000 survey in 1,074 regularised immigrants in Athens found that “[t]he most frequently reported 
problem was the difficulty of finding legal work (offers from employers for informal employment 
abounded) (Cavounidis, 2003). 
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workers, balancing gains and costs from moving to legality, have chosen not to apply 
for legalization (Sarris and Markova, 2001). 
 
Moving to the official economy, immigrants will leave vacancies in the unofficial 
economy. To the extent that their employment in this segment of the labour market 
had displaced native workers, these vacancies can be filled by displaced natives. 
But, if the vacancies will not be filled by natives, the wages of the native unskilled 
workers in the official economy will decrease, due to the increasing supply of 
regularized immigrants that will receive higher wages, compared to what they were 
getting in the unofficial economy.  
 
An important factor that should be taken into consideration in this context for Greece 
is that about 1/3 of illegal immigrants have education, general or technical, beyond 
the primary (Lianos, Sarris, Katseli, 1996). From those applied for legalization, about 
half declared to hold secondary education diplomas and 9 per cent tertiary 
educational level degrees (Kanellopoulos, 2005). Thus, the immigrants appearing in 
the official economy with high education or technical expertise may even compete 
with some categories of native skilled workers, pulling down their wages. 
 
Legalisation leads also to family unification that will increase the demand for high 
cost social services, i.e. education, health, etc. Family unification, augmenting the 
cost of social services that may only partially be met by the taxes and social security 
contributions of the immigrants themselves, may indirectly reduce the after tax 
income of the native population. This negative impact is likely if the contribution of 
immigrants in the skilled native workers’ wages and capital return is smaller than the 





The work of illegal immigrants is affecting in various and contradictory ways the 
employment, the wages and the distribution of income of Greeks. There are no one-
dimensional exclusively favourable or exclusively unfavourable holistic effects. There 
are instead partly positive and partly negative impacts on different groups of workers, 
categories of households, sectors of the economy and regions of the country. The 
resultant of all these effects forms the total picture of changes in the labour market 
and the economy at large, which in the long-run is realistically perhaps positive. This 
may be the case if, in the absence of illegal immigrants, a potential different structure 
of the economy and the capital intensity of production would not have created 
employment and incomes overshadowing the long-term benefits generated by the 
presence of illegal immigrants. 
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